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 Since 1990, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) audits have assessed 
supply chain management as a high-risk area within the Department of Defense (DoD). 
In response to these findings, the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) developed the 
National Inventory Management Strategy (NIMS) initiative.  This initiative combines the 
consumable repair inventories of DLA (wholesale level) and each armed service (retail 
level) into a single national inventory. The United States Navy and DLA established test 
sites at Naval Air Station Ingleside, Naval Air Station Whidbey Island, and Marine Corps 
Air Station Miramar to demonstrate its benefits and measure its performance. The aim of 
this report is to analyze NIMS preliminary performance metrics in terms of effectiveness 
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Why is effective supply chain management important for DoD? There are 
two primary reasons. First, supply support to the warfighter affects 
readiness and military operations. In fact, the supply chain can be the 
critical link in determining whether our front-line military forces win or 
lose on the battlefield. Second, given the high demand for goods and 
services to support ongoing U.S. military operations, the investment of 
resources in supply chain is substantial.1   
Since 1990, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) audits have assessed 
supply chain management as a high-risk area within the Department of Defense (DoD).2 
It reports problems such as:  
• Lack of Joint Long Term Supply Chain Management Strategy  
• Lack of Total Asset Visibility  
• Critical  Parts Shortages 
• High Backorder Rates   
• Inaccurate Inventory Data  
• Inefficient Legacy Management Systems 
In response to these findings, the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) developed the 
Strategic Management System.3  This system aims at transforming logistics operations 
within DoD. It identifies 18 strategic initiatives that aim at mitigating shortages of spare 
parts. One of these initiatives is the National Inventory Management Strategy that seeks 
                                                 
 1 GAO Report, GAO-06-983T, “DOD’s High Risk Areas: Challenges Remain to Achieving and 
Demonstrating Progress in Supply Chain Management”, Statement by Williams M Solis, Director Defense 
Capabilities Management   July 2006 
 2 Ibid  
 3 GAO Report, GAO-03-709, “Defense Inventory: Several Actions Are Needed to Further DLA’s 
Efforts to Mitigate Shortages of Critical Parts”, August. 2003 
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to extend DLA’s supply chain management of consumable repair items beyond the 
wholesale level to provide supply support directly to the point of consumption.4  
DLA’s intends to use NIMS to combine consumable repair inventories of DLA 
(wholesale level) and each armed service (retail level) into a single national inventory. 
The combining of inventories allows DLA to create a uniform managed system that 
allows the pre-positioning of supplies according to regional usage and customer input.  
As a result, there is a reduction in customer wait time and an increase of parts 
availability, which contributes to the supply readiness of the military services.  
DoD recognized the need to improve supply performance in its August 
2001  Defense Planning Guidance which directed a review of inventory 
management  practices and stockage levels during the fiscal year 2003 
program/budget review. The initial results of this study were included in 
the fiscal year 2002 Program  Budget Decision 422, which recommended 
the department further study inventory management including developing 
a plan  to streamline inventory management  practices and improve supply 
chain management. More specifically, it suggested the department address 
the effect of inventory levels on weapons systems readiness.5 
In 2001, under the guidance of Program Budget Decision (PBD) 422 the armed 
services developed plans to reduce their retail consumable inventories by transferring the 
ownership and management of consumable repair items to DLA to implement NIMS.  
DLA and the United Sates Navy initially established three test sites: Naval Air Station 
Ingleside, Naval Air Station Whidbey Island, and Marine Corps Air Station Miramar to 
measure the effectiveness of NIMS on supply chain management of consumable parts.  
 
B. OBJECTIVE 
The objective of this research is to determine how effective NIMS has been in 
improving supply chain management within the Navy test sites. To reach this objective, 
                                                 
 4 GAO Report, GAO-03-709, “Defense Inventory: Several Actions Are Needed to Further DLA’s 
Efforts to Mitigate Shortages of Critical Parts”, August. 2003 
5 GAO Report, GAO-03-707, “Defense Inventory: The Department Needs a Focused Effort to 
Overcome Critical Spare Parts Shortages”, June 2003 
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the research will analyze supply chain management process within DLA and conduct an 
evaluation of preliminary NIMS performance data.  
Primary research question:  
• How effective has, the implementation of the National Inventory Management 
Strategy been in improving supply chain management within Defense 
Logistics Agency? 
Supporting questions: 
• What were the factors that created a need to transform inventory management 
practices within DoD? 
• How does the supply chain process work within DoD? 
• What is the purpose of DLA’s National Inventory Management Strategy? 
• What impact has NIMS had on DLA’s supply chain management? 
 
C. SCOPE OF REPORT 
The scope of this report is based on government related data concerning supply 
chain management and the analysis of preliminary data obtained from NIMS test sites. 
The aim of the report is to analyze NIMS results in terms of effectiveness, efficiency and 
its impact on supply chain management within the Navy and DLA. The report is divided 
into to two parts. Part one provides an historical background of inventory management 
within DLA and an overview of the NIMS initiative. Part two of the report presents the 
analysis and recommendations.    
 
D. METHODOLOGY 
Various research methods were used to determine how effective NIMS has been 
in the improvement of supply chain management within DLA and the U.S. Navy. We 




Test Site Metrics  
Preliminary metrics data from January 2006 thru September 2006 were obtained 
from the following NIMS test sites: 
Naval Air Station Ingleside, Texas 
Naval Air Station Whidbey Island, Washington  
Marine Corps Air Station Miramar, California  
Interviews with Officials 
This information was obtained from telephonic interviews, e-mail 
correspondence, and limited site visits to the following organizations:  
Defense Logistics Agency HQ,  Retail Integration Division, Virginia  
DLA Office of Operations Research and Resource Analysis (DORRA), Virginia 
Department of Navy: Aviation Support Unit, MCAS Miramar, California 
Government Documents  
Various sources of government documents were utilized to gather background 
information. Key documents included House National Security Committee Testimony, 
Congressional Research Service (CRS) reports to U.S. Congress, and memorandums to 
the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense Logistics and Material Readiness. Additionally, 
we relied on Government Accountability Office (GAO) reports for information about 
ongoing supply chain processes, and articles concerning current supply management 
issues.    
 
E. ORGANIZATION OF REPORT 
Following this introduction, the remainder of this report is organized in the 
following manner: Chapter II describes the historical background of supply chain 
management within DoD and provides a brief history of DLA. Chapter III describes the 
supply chain management process within DLA and the United States Navy. Chapter IV 
 5
describes the NIMS concept. Chapter V describes and analyzes the preliminary data from 
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II. THE HISTORY OF DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY (DLA) 
In January of 2001, the Bush Administration identified “transformation” as a 
major goal for the Department of Defense (DoD).6  Transformation within DoD was 
defined “as a large-scale, discontinuous, and possibly disruptive change in military 
weapons, concepts of operations and organization.”7 According to Vice Admiral Keith 
W. Lippert, DLA Director, transforming logistics is a continual process and not an end 
state.8  We are leaving behind our legacy business model and organizational structures 
and transforming to become:  
1. A robust customer-focused agency with world class military service and 
warfighter partnering capabilities 
2. A manager and integrator of the supply chains essential to military 
readiness with world class commercial supplier partnering capabilities 
3. A single, fully integrated enterprise 
Since the inception of the DLA, it has continuously strived to improve supply 
support for the American Warfighter.  Despite its achievements, the agency believes it 
must continue to undergo transformation in order to continue to meet the demands and 
improve support.  The purpose of this chapter is to provide an historical background on 
the transformation processes of integrated supply management within DoD.  
 
A. EARLY YEARS (CONSOLIDATION)  
During World War II, the Army and Navy maintained separate supply 
inventories, storage facilities, and transportation services. As well as separate 
procurement systems for repair parts, fuel, medical supplies, clothing, and other 
                                                 
       6 CRS Report for Congress RL32238: “Defense Transformation: Background and Oversight Issues for 
Congress”, Ronald O’Rourke, February 17, 2006 
 7 Ibid 
 8 “Acquisition Community Connection: DLA Transformation Roadmap (2006)”, November 2005 
https://acc.dau.mil/CommunityBrowser.aspx?id=32166 (Last accessed September 2006) 
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consumable commodities.  By the end of World War II, the Army managed seven supply 
systems and the Navy managed eighteen.  Some people believed that having too many 
supply systems led to inefficiencies within DoD.  The National Security Act of 1947 
prompted new efforts to eliminate duplication of inventories and overlapping supply 
systems.  As a result, the Munitions Board was created in order to reorganize the major 
supply systems into a joint procurement agency.  By 1949, the Commission on the 
Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, known as the Hoover 
Commission, authorized the Secretary of Defense to create a single integrated supply 
agency.9 
In 1952, Congress was not resolved with the efforts put forth by the Munitions 
Board and created the  Defense Supply Management Agency (DSMA), but by 1953 the 
Eisenhower Reorganization Plan Number 6 dissolved the DSMA and transferred the 
responsibility of transformation to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Supply and 
Logistics.10  Under the direction of the Assistant Secretary, a joint Support Center 
consisting of the Army, Navy, and Air Force supply and quartermaster personnel was 
established to control the identification of supply items and the management of services. 
This marked the beginning of military services procuring and managing items in an 
integrated manner.11 
During 1955, a second Hoover Commission recommended that common military 
supply items and logistics support be combined by category and each category be 
centrally managed by a civilian agency.12  The commission felt this approach would 
reduce waste and inefficiencies within the military services.  On the other hand, the 
military services feared that that such an agency would be less responsive to military 
                                                 
 9 “Global Security: Defense Logistics Agency History”, April 2005 
www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/dod/dla-history.htm (Last accessed September 2006) 
 10 “U.S. Code Title 5 Appendix”, May 2002, www.access.gpo.gov/uscode/title5a/5a_4_54_1_.html 
(Last accessed November 2006) 
 11 “Global Security: Defense Logistics Agency History”, April 2005 
www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/dod/dla-history.htm (Last accessed September  2006) 
 12 Ibid 
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requirements and jeopardize the success of military operations.13  Following the guidance 
of the commission recommendations, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Supply and 
Logistics approved a defense directive in November 1955 that appointed each of the three 
service secretaries as a single manager for a selected group of commodities.14  Under this 
directive, the Army managed all food and clothing items; Navy managed medical 
supplies, petroleum, and repair parts; and Air Force managed the electronic 
commodities.15  This single concept will direct: 
• Worldwide inventories; research; procurement; stock fund operation; 
• Screening excesses; training; net requirement computation;  
• Cataloging and standardization; inspection and quality control;  
• Distribution and redistribution; storage and transportation; and 
• Major maintenance and repair.16 
This single manager concept reduced each services investment by centralizing 
wholesale inventories.  This single manager concept was a tremendous success because 
over a six-year period, the single manager agencies reduced their item assignments by 
about 9,000, or 20 percent, and their inventories by about $800 million, or 30 percent.17  





                                                 
 13 “Global Security: Defense Logistics Agency History”, April 2005 
www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/dod/dla-history.htm (Last accessed September  2006) 
 14 “Special Studies from Root to McNamara Army Organization and Administration”, Hewes, James, 
E., September 1973 www.army.mil/cmh/books/root/chapter7.htm (Last accessed October  2006) 
 15 “Global Security: Defense Logistics Agency History”, April 2005  
www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/dod/dla-history.htm  (Last accessed October 2006) 
 16 “Industrial College of the Armed Forces: Single Manager Plan”, November 1955 
www.ndu.edu/library/ic3/L56-063.pdf (Last accessed September 2006) 
 17 “Global Security: Defense Logistics Agency History”, April 2005 
www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/dod/dla-history.htm (Last accessed September 2006) 
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B. PROJECT 100 AND DEFENSE SUPPLY AGENCY 
Secretary of Defense, Robert S. McNamara realized that the single manager 
concept was successful, but it failed to implement the procedures set forth by the second 
Hoover Commission.18 In 1961, McNamara ordered the “Project 100” inquiry.  The 
objective of the inquiry was to examine the following issues:  
1. Should DoD continue the existing single manager system under the three 
service secretaries; 
 
2. Should it be consolidated under one service secretary; or  
3. Should the Secretary of Defense assume the responsibility of 
management? 
 
The inquiry concluded that the existing system of multiple single managers 
created inefficiencies and redundancy in DoD supply chain management.19  Secretary 
McNamara was convinced that the problem required some kind of an organization 
arrangement to “manage the managers.”20  However, the report concluded that 
consolidation under one service secretary would be impractical because of service biases 
for their own programs.  
The recommended solution was to establish a common supply and service activity 
that would manage wholesale distribution, while allowing the individual services to 
maintain individual retail distribution supply system.  In January of 1962, the Defense 
Supply Agency (DSA) was established as a common supply and service agency.21  DSA 
became the wholesale level manager of consumable supply items for the services, 
assuming the responsibility of wholesale inventory and distribution support. DSA (by 
1977 DSA was renamed Defense Logistics Agency) streamlined and consolidated depot 
                                                 
 18 “Industrial College of the Armed Forces: Single Manager Plan”, November 1955 
www.ndu.edu/library/ic3/L56-063.pdf (Last accessed September 2006) 
 19 “Industrial College of the Armed Forces: Single Manager Plan”, November 1955 
www.ndu.edu/library/ic3/L56-063.pdf (Last accessed September 2006). 
 20 “Global Security: Defense Logistics Agency History”, April 2005 
www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/dod/dla-history.htm (Last accessed September 2006) 
 21 “Special Studies from Root to McNamara Army Organization and Administration”, Hewes, James, 
E.., September 1973 www.army.mil/cmh/books/root/chapter8.htm (Last accessed October 2006) 
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operations to provide better supply and logistics support to the services. In October 1986, 
the Goldwaters-Nichols Reorganization Act established DLA as a combat support agency 
responsible for the operational requirements needed to enhance the military services 
material readiness, to provide for sustainability, and to determine the most effective and 
economical way of supporting its customer.22  In July 1989, Secretary of Defense 
Richard Cheney’s Defense Management Review report emphasized improving 
management efficiencies in DoD by “cutting excess infrastructure, eliminating redundant 
functions, and initiating common business practices.”23 
 
C. REENGINEERING OF DLA BUSINESS PROCESSES 
As of 2006, DLA manages over 5.2 million line items in inventory worth $94.1 
billion and has estimated sales and services of $35.5 billion.24  Aggressive transformation 
initiatives have streamlined the organizational structure by consolidating numerous 
Inventory Control Points and Distributions Centers into a single integrated enterprise.25 
Despite these implementations and achievements, DLA recognizes that transformation is 
a continues process which requires innovative ideas to continue to improve DoD 
readiness.  
In 2006, DLA published their “Transformation Roadmap” which provided an 
outline of their four strategic goals and 13 key initiatives to continue the on-going 
transformation of logistics and supply support.  One of the key initiatives is the National 
Inventory Management Strategy, which supports DLA’s goals of developing and 
institutionalizing the internal processes required to deliver value added logistics solutions 
to the Warfighter and manage DLA resources for customer value.  Since its inception in 
January 1962, DLA has standardized, procured, managed, and distributed DoD 
                                                 
 22 “Global Security: Defense Logistics Agency History”, April 2005  
www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/dod/dla-history.htm (Last accessed September 2006) 
 23 “Global Security: Defense Logistics Agency History”, April 2005  
www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/dod/dla-history.htm (Last accessed September 2006) 
 24 “Defense Logistics Agency: Facts and Figures”, October 2006 www.dla.mil/public_info/facts.asp 
(Last accessed September 2006) 
 25 “Acquisition Community Connection: DLA Transformation Roadmap  2006”, November 2005 
https://acc.dau.mil/CommunityBrowser.aspx?id=32166 (Last accessed September 2006) 
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consumable supply items to the warfighter.  DLA also has gone through extensive 
reorganization in its efforts to eliminate redundant supply management practices and 
logistics services. This chapter provided the historical background of integrated supply 
management with DoD.  The following chapter will provide a brief overview on the 
current supply inventory management concept used in DoD. 
 13
III. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE SUPPLY CHAIN 
MANAGEMENT 
The Department of Defense (DoD) has been working for decades on fixing its 
inefficiencies of inventory management since the inception of creating a single integrated 
supply agency.  Some of these inventory management problems include outdated and 
inefficient inventory management practices, inadequate inventory oversight, weak 
financial accountability, and overstated requirements.  According to the United States 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) testimony before Congress on March 1997, 
GAO identified DoD’s inventory management as one of their 25 high-risk areas in the 
federal government because of its vulnerabilities to waste, fraud, and abuse.26    
In the short term, DoD must continue to stress the efficient operations of 
its existing logistics systems. This includes disposing of unneeded 
inventory, implementing efficient and effective inventory management 
practices, training personnel and rewarding the right behavior, improving 
data accuracy, and enforcing existing policies to minimize the acquisition 
of unneeded inventory. In the long term, DoD must establish goals, 
objectives, and milestones for changing its culture and adopting new 
management tools and practices. Key to changing DoD’s management 
culture will be an aggressive approach using best practices from the 
private sector.27 
DoD’s goal is to use best business practices from the private sector.  Just like the 
private sector, DoD faces the challenge of improving its services while lowering costs on 
a day to day basis.  DoD needs to adopt innovative business practices to meet or exceed 
customer needs while continuing to exercise a fiscal budget that keeps getting tighter. 
This chapter will provide a brief overview of the current supply inventory management 
concept used in DoD.  The focus will be on the two levels of inventory and the supply 
systems within DoD, specifically Defense Logistics Agency and the United States Navy.   
 
                                                 
 26 GAO Report, GAO/T-NSIAD-97-109: “Defense Inventory Management: Problems, Progress, and 
Additional Actions Needed, March 1997 
 27 Ibid 
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A. WHOLESALE AND RETAIL CONCEPT  
DoD operates its supply system based on the wholesale (DLA) and retail (military 
services) levels of inventory.  The wholesale and retail levels are made up of secondary 
inventories that include consumable supplies, such as parts, clothing, medical, 
subsistence, and end items that are discarded after use rather than repaired.  The first 
level of inventory is the wholesale level and is responsible for the procurement of items 
from manufacturers, commercial or wholesale suppliers and vendors.  These items are 
maintained in distribution warehouses or Inventory Control Points (ICPs).  Some critics 
feel this has resulted in holding excessive inventory.  The large inventory of consumable 
items reflects DoD’s management practices of relying on large stock levels to readily 
meet its customers needs.28  For example, DoD continue to store redundant levels of 
clothing and textile inventories at both wholesale and retail locations and to hold such 
inventories for longer periods of time than the private sector firms.29  The culture in DoD 
was that it was better to over-stock items than to manage with just the amount of stock 
needed.  DoD stores its inventory at three or more levels to provide items to end users 
when needed.  Figure 3.1 shows DoD’s multilayered inventory system.30  The retail level 
and customers purchase consumable items from the wholesale level and store the 
inventories in nearby base or station warehouses, central storage, and unit locations. 
 
 
                                                 
 28 GAO Report, GAO/NSIAD-95-142: “Inventory Management: DoD Can Build on Progress in Using 
Best Practices to Achieve Substantial Savings”, August 1995 
 29 GAO Report, GAO/NSIAD-94-64: “Commercial Practices: Leading-Edge Practices Can Help DoD 
Better Manage Clothing and Textile Stocks, April 1994 
 30 GAO Report, GAO/NSIAD-95-142: “Inventory Management: DoD Can Build on Progress in Using 
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Figure 3.1: Multilayered Inventory System used by DoD.31 
 
 
B. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE SUPPLY SYSTEMS  
The DoD supply chain process encompasses those government and private-sector 
organizations, processes, and systems that individually or collectively play a role in 
planning for, acquiring, maintaining, or delivering material resources for military or other 
operations conducted in support of the United States national defense interest.32  The 






                                                 
 31 GAO Report, GAO/NSIAD-95-142: “Inventory Management: DoD Can Build on Progress in Using 
Best Practices to Achieve Substantial Savings”, August 1995 
32 Acquisition Community Connection: DLA Transformation Roadmap (2006), November 2005 
www.acc.dau.mil  (Last accessed September 2006) 
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Figure 3.2: Supply Chain Management.33 
 
1. Defense Logistics Agency 
The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) is comprised of a Headquarters component, 
five Defense Supply Centers (DSC), and 26 Defense Distribution Centers (DDC).34  
DLA’s headquarters is located at Fort Belvoir, Virginia and is DoD’s largest combat 
support agency, providing worldwide logistics support in both peacetime and wartime to 
the military services as well as several civilian agencies and foreign countries.35  It also 
provides logistics support to other DoD Components and certain Federal agencies, 
foreign governments, international organizations, and others as authorized.  DLA 
employs a workforce of more than 20,000 military and civilian personnel and supports 
the procurement, management, storage, and distribution of 5.2 million items for U.S. 
military customers, other federal agencies, and allied forces.36  One of DLA’s missions is 
to manage 95 percent of the military services’ supply needs, such as repair parts, food, 
fuel, medical, clothing and textile, and construction materials.37  In Fiscal Year 2006, 
                                                 
 33 Acquisition Community Connection web site, www.acc.dau.mil  (Last accessed November 2006) 
 34 DLA Logistics Operations, November 2006 www.supply.dla.mil/DLA_centers.asp#Supply  (Last 
accessed November 2006) 
 35 “Defense Logistics Agency: Facts and Figures”, October 2006 www.dla.mil/public_info/facts.asp 
(Last accessed September 2006) 
 36 DLA Logistics Operations website, www.supply.dla.mil (Last accessed November 2006) 
 37 Defense Logistics Agency: Business Opportunities, November 2006 
www.dla.mil/bussOppsMain.asp (Last accessed November 2006) 
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DLA’s sales and services totaled $35.5 billion and maintain an inventory value of $94.1 
billion.38   DLA is organized as a Defense Working Capital Fund activity.  This means 
that DLA does not receive annual appropriations from Congress rather, it relies on lateral 
transfers of budget authority, primarily from appropriated fund customers. 
2. Defense Supply Centers 
The Defense Supply Centers (DSCs) act as DLA’s Inventory Control Points 
whose responsibility is to manage DoD’s materials and supplies.39  DSCs consolidates all 
military services requirements and procures materials in optimal quantities needed to 
meet customers’ needs.  The procured items are then delivered directly from a 
commercial vendor.  Residual stock that remains is stored at and distributed from the 
distribution centers worldwide.  Each of the five DSC locations store different 
commodities.  For example, the supply center in Richmond, Virginia is the primary 
source of supply for aviation supply.40  The five DSCs are located in Columbus, Ohio; 
Richmond, Virginia; Philadelphia and Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania; and the Defense 
Energy Support Center headquartered at Fort Belvoir, Virginia. 
3. Defense Distribution Centers 
The Defense Distribution Centers (DDCs) are located throughout the United 
States and around the world.41  Its headquarters is in New Cumberland, Pennsylvania.  
DDCs mission is to provide the full range of distribution services and information 
enabling a seamless, tailored, worldwide DoD distribution network that delivers 
effective, efficient and innovative support to combatant commands, military services, and 
other agencies during peace and war.42  The DDCs operational responsibilities include 
receipt, storage, issue, packing, preservation, worldwide transportation, in-transit 
                                                 
 38 “Defense Logistics Agency: Facts and Figures”, October 2006 www.dla.mil/public_info/facts.asp 
(Last accessed September 2006) 
 39 DLA Logistics Operations, November 2006 www.supply.dla.mil/DLA_centers.asp#Supply  (Last 
accessed November 2006) 
 40 Defense Supply Center Richmond website www.dscr.dla.mil (Last accessed November 2006) 
 41“DLA Defense Distribution Center: Functions of a Distribution Center”, 
www.ddc.dla.mil/Sites//functions.asp  (Last accessed November 2006) 
 42 DLA Defense Distribution Center: Strategic, November 2006 www.ddc.dla.mil/aboutddc/lrpv.htm 
(Last accessed November 2006) 
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visibility and redirecting en-route, when required, of all items placed under its 
accountability by DLA and the military services.  The 26 DDCs store more than 3.9 
million line items and process more than 26 million transactions annually.43  As DLA’s  
lead centers’ for distribution, the DDCs are responsible for commodities such as clothing, 
textiles, electronics, industrial, construction supplies, subsistence, medical material, and 
principle end items. 
 
Figure 3.3: Defense Distribution Centers NDTA DDSP44 
 
C. UNITED STATES NAVY 
The Navy supply system is integrated with the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) 
supply system.45  The following sections describe the operation of the integrated Navy 
                                                 
 43 DLA Defense Distribution Center website www.ddc.dla.mil/aboutddc/lrpi.htm (Last accessed 
November 2006) 
       44 Defense Distribution Center website, www.ndtahq.com/download/NDTA_DDSP_Briefing.pdf  
(Last accessed November 2006) 
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supply system, in providing material required by the Operating Forces.   The following 
overview of the Navy’s supply systems shows the relationship of the various elements. 
1. Naval Supply Systems Command 
The Naval Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP) headquarters is located in 
Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania.  NAVSUP employs more than 24,000 military and 
civilian personnel worldwide.46  Its primary responsibility is to provide supply support to 
Navy, Marine Corps, Joint and Allied Forces worldwide.47  It sets the policies, 
procedures, and integrated business systems that govern the Navy supply system.  
NAVSUP coordinates with DLA to determine its consumable inventory allowances and 
storage warehouse locations in order to provide the maximum level of operational 
readiness and efficient stock levels.  NAVSUP is responsible for setting optimum levels 
of inventory to determine how many consumable line items the customers should keep on 
stock to meet mission readiness.  The two major activities under NAVSUP are the Naval 
Inventory Control Point’s (NAVICP) in Mechanicsburg and Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 
along with seven Fleet and Industrial Supply Centers (FISCs).  The NAVICP and FISC 
store wholesale and retail level consumable items. 
2. Naval Inventory Control Point 
The Naval Inventory Control Points (NAVICPs) primary mission is to procure, 
manage, and supply repair parts for naval aircraft, submarines, and ships worldwide.48  
Their mission is carried out by a single command organization operating as a tenant 
activity of the Naval Support Activities in Mechanicsburg and Philadelphia, 
Pennsylvania.  The responsibilities of NAVICPs are: 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
 45 Integrated Publishing: Supply Organization website     
 www.tpub.com/content/administration/14242/css/14242_23.htm (Last accessed November 2006) 
 46 Naval Supply Systems Command web site, 
www.navsup.navy.mil/portal/page?_pageid=477,261535&_dad=p5star&_schema=P5STAR (Last accessed 
November 2006) 
 47Naval Supply System Command Corporate Strategic Plan: NAVSUP Mission website,  
www.navsup.navy.mil/pls/p5star/docs/PAGE/NAVSUP/OURTEAM/NAVSUP%20CORPORATE%20ST
RATEGIC%20PLAN.PDF (Last accessed November 2006) 
 48 “Global Security: Naval Supply Systems Command website, 
www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/navy/navsup.htm (Last accessed November 2006) 
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 Position material at various stock points 
 Retain inventory control of material through an extensive stock  reporting 
 system 
 Provide technical assistance and cataloging services to 
the supply system (and to its customers).49 
NAVICP is responsible for more that 400,000 line items with an inventory of 
$15.5 billion and annual sales of $3.2 billion.50 
3. Fleet and Industrial Supply Centers 
The Fleet and Industrial Supply Centers (FISCs) provide a variety of supply 
support and services to Navy, Marine Corps and other joint and allied military customers 
in their respective regions.51  The FISCs are responsible for determining inventory levels, 
procuring, receiving, storing, issuing, shipping, or delivering material to its customers.  
The FISCs are the primary contact points of the operating force for material support.  









                                                 
 49 Integrated Publishing: Supply Organization website,  
www.tpub.com/content/administration/14242/css/14242_23.htm  (Last accessed November 2006) 
 50 Global Security: Naval Supply Systems Command website, 
www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/navy/navsup.htm (Last accessed November 2006) 
 51 Ibid. 
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Figure 3.4: Navy Regional Fleet and Industrial Supply Centers 52 
 
This chapter described the current supply inventory management concept used in 
DoD.  The next chapter will provide an overview of DLA’s National Inventory 
















                                                 
 52 Naval Supply Systems Command website, 
www.navsup.navy.mil/portal/page?_pageid=477,264024,477_264041&_dad=p5star&_schema=P5STAR 
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IV. NATIONAL INVENTORY MANAGEMENT STRATEGY 
This is not the first time DLA has used a consolidated supply management 
strategy; this approach has been utilized successfully by DLA in the management of fuel, 
medical, and subsistence supplies. Unlike the aforementioned commodities, the 
management of repair parts presents a greater challenge due to the variations of 
consumable repair parts and the difficulty of managing separate vendors. This chapter 
provides an overview of the National Inventory Management Strategy (NIMS) purpose, 
concept of operation, benefits, and possible challenges. 
 
A. NATIONAL INVENTORY MANAGEMENT STRATEGY (NIMS) 
Under the guidance set forth by Program Budget Decision 422, services are 
required to develop plans to reduce consumable inventories by transferring them to DLA. 
The result would yield an inventory management strategy that would streamline the 
management process of repair parts. Once implemented, it would create a supply system 
that would be managed from a single owner-manager perspective. 
5
A National Inventory ti l I t r
DLA, Service, and Site will 
negotiate inventory 
management solutions, 
creating a tailored logistics 
solution by site.
DLA owns the inventory 
investment to end-user 
point of sale.
Retail pass-through charges 



















Figure 4.1: NIMS Strategy53  
 
 
                                                 
 53 DLA Transformation Roadmap, FY 2006 https://acc.dau.mil/CommunityBrowser.aspx?id=32166 
(Last accessed November 2006) 
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1. Purpose and Objective  
The purpose of NIMS is to allow the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) to extend 
its supply chain management of repair parts from the wholesale level to the point of 
consumption. The initiative aims at combining consumable inventories from the 
wholesale level (DLA) and the retail level (Service-managed retail inventory level) into a 
single-owner management concept. The result would yield increase efficiency and 
productivity of the entire consumable supply chain.  
The objective of NIMS is to manage consumable items from the point of 
acquisition to the point of consumption for the services. The result would be total asset 
visibility for all of the services, reduction in the layers of inventory management, 
improvement of demand forecast and stock efficiency, consolidation of inventory, and 
greater cross-leveling of supplies within the defense community. It would provide the 
flexibility to tailor logistics, supply support, and stock positioning throughout DoD.54 
2. Concept of Operation  
Prior to implementing NIMS, the ownership of inventory was transferred from the 
owning service to DLA. This process was done as transparently as possible to minimize 
disruption of the organization’s existing supply chain process. Once NIMS is 
implemented, an inventory baseline is established based on the customer’s historical 
supply demands. Under NIMS, the services will continue to use existing supply systems 
to track inventory management and retail infrastructures, allowing consumables to be 
maintained at forward positions.  Although the inventories are maintained at retail 
locations, the services do not pay holding cost of inventory until organizational level 
units procure items. This allows DLA and the services to establish joint monitoring 
performance measures for example customer material availability.55 NIMS was 
developed in four phases. As of November 2006, NIMS is in Phase III (Testing).   
                                                 
 54 “DLA’s New Inventory Management Strategy”, Major General Hawthorne L. Proctor and Captain 
Aaron J. Cook, September 2002 www.almc.army.mil/alog/issues/SepOct02/MS823.htm  (Last accessed 
September  2006) 
 55 PR Newswire: “DLA Navy Pilot National Inventory Program at Whidbey Island”, November 2005  
www.prnewswire.com/cgi-bin/stories.pl?ACCT=104&STORY=/www/story/11-23-
2005/0004222080&EDATE (Last accessed October 2006) 
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Phases of Development 56 
Phase I Concept Development: Develop the current process benchmarks. 
• Map “as is” current processes 
• Define baseline performance and measures  
• Identify system linkages 
Phase II Planning and Coordination: Study, analyze, and coordinate 
identification of best value options, obstacles and testing opportunities. 
• Map “to-be” future processes 
• Develop improved performance measures 
• Brief NIMS to services and DLA teams 
• Develop Customers Relationship Management (CRM) strategy 
• Identify pilot sites 
Phase III Testing: DLA and services test NIMS at field sites to demonstrate its 
benefits. 
• Establish stockage policy, asset utilization, item transfer, and scope 
• Measure pilot site performance against baseline 
• Monitor and measure resource impacts, information technology linkages 
and  cost savings 
Phase IV NIMS Rollout: DLA and services implement and monitor rollout plan. 
• Track site-specific and overall performance measures 
 
                                                 
 56 “DLA’s New Inventory Management Strategy”, Major General Hawthorne L. Proctor and Captain 
Aaron J. Cook, September 2002 found at www.almc.army.mil/alog/issues/SepOct02/MS823.htm  (Last 
accessed September 2006) 
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3. Benefits  
Primary benefits of NIMS include single point of access for users and total 
visibility of consumable inventories by DLA and the services.57 Single point access and 
total visibility allows DLA and the services to implement better inventory allocation and 
distribution based on the demands by the services. The benefits of NIMS for the services 
include higher levels of supply readiness, reduction in customer wait time, tailored 
logistics support, optimization of supply chain, ownership cost avoidance and the ability 
to better focus on their core competency.  For DLA, the benefits include better resource 
allocation management, improvement in material availability; focus on core 
competencies, better ability to make sound decisions on how much material to buy and 
when to buy it, and reduction in redundant inventory.  
4. Challenges  
A number of challenges could interfere with DLA’s long-term plan of NIMS 
implementation.58 First, DoD lacks a joint long-term strategy in its efforts to integrate 
supply chain management throughout DoD. Second, integration of numerous legacy  
information systems to manage supply chain management within DoD.  Finally, data 
accuracy and reliability issues hinder inventory management system integration.   
a. Lack of Joint Long Term Strategy for Supply-Chain 
Management  
 In response to Program Budget Decision 422, dated December 
2001, each  of the military services developed separate plans for 
implementing decision, which reflected a disparity in the extent to which 
they were willing to implement the department policy. While this 
document called for military services to eliminate duplicative retail supply 
operations by returning management and ownership of DLA managed 
items being held by military services to DLA, the services’ 
implementation plans  each interpreted the requirements differently. For 
Example, the Navy plan called for small number of pilot sites where DLA 
would  take over the ownership of the DLA managed items being stored at 
                                                 
 57 GAO Report, GAO-03-709: “Defense Inventory: Several Actions Are Needed to Further DLA’s 
Efforts to Mitigate Shortages of Critical Parts”, August 2003 
 58 GAO Report, GAO-05-15: “Defense Inventory: Improvements Needed in DOD’s Implementation 
of its Long-Term Strategy for Total Asset Visibility of its Inventory”, December 2004 
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the Navy supply activities. The Air Force, on the other hand, did not 
participate in any of the pilot projects, and planned only to eliminate co-
located inventories items at the Air Logistics Centers.59 
b. Information Systems Integration 
 DoD has not achieved the necessary integration or interoperability 
of its  inventory (business) systems to support Total Asset Visibility. 
TAV cannot be achieved unless these multiple business systems provide 
users such as combatant commanders, operating units and inventory 
managers with accurate data on the quantity, location, condition, and 
movement of inventory. As part of its ongoing business systems 
modernization efforts DoD is creating a repository of the department’s 
existing business systems. As of April 2003, this repository contained 210 
inventory related information systems within the logistics domain.  As of 
May 2004, these systems are not integrated.60    
 
c. Data Accuracy and Reliability Issues 
 Military service audit agencies and the DoD Inspector General 
identified various types of inaccurate inventory data in the military 
services’ information  systems. Since fiscal year 2002, these inaccuracies 
included more than $200 million of excess or unrecorded inventory that 
was not visible to item managers as well as significant misstatements in 
the reported inventory balances. Since these unrecorded inventories were 
not visible to item managers, they could not be used to satisfy current 
operating requirements and represent an unnecessary cost if additional 
inventory was purchased that was not needed. To illustrate this point, the 
Air Force Audit Agency identified a $3.3 million overstatement in the 
procurement and repair requirement for three aircraft systems that resulted 
from  the lack of visibility over $10.8 million worth of inventory for 
these three systems.61  
This chapter provided an overview of NIMS purpose, concept of 
operation, benefits, and possible challenges. The next chapter will provide an analysis of 
preliminary data from the Naval Air Station test sites Ingleside, Whidbey Island, and 
Miramar. 
                                                 
 59 GAO Report, GAO-05-15: “Defense Inventory: Improvements Needed in DOD’s Implementation 
of its Long-Term Strategy for Total Asset Visibility of its Inventory”, December 2004 
60 Ibid 
 61 GAO Report, GAO-05-15: “Defense Inventory: Improvements Needed in DOD’s Implementation 
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V. EFFECTIVENESS OF NIMS 
As discussed in the previous chapters, DLA has been plagued with inventory 
management issues for decades.  These inventory management issues were highlighted in 
a Government Accountability Office (GAO) report dated March 1997.62  The main issues 
include; high customer wait times, duplicate inventories, obsolete/no demand inventory, 
and failure to meet the demands of the services.  The GAO report stated, “Much of 
DOD’s unneeded inventory was acquired because of outdated and inefficient inventory 
management practices.”63 Therefore, one of the initiatives that DLA created to correct 
these inefficiencies was NIMS.  DLA identified several key goals to achieve the level of 
efficiency required to support the services.  These goals as identified in previous chapters 
include:  
• Establishing one national inventory  
• Tailoring inventory to meet each service’s requirements  
• Reducing redundant inventory levels  
• Lowering overall DOD inventory costs   
This chapter will analyze the effectiveness of NIMS in achieving these goals at 
three Navy test sites: Naval Air Station (NAS) Ingleside, NAS Whidbey Island and 
Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Miramar.  First, we will look at the implementation 
challenges at each of the NIMS sites, the definitions used within the metrics provided by 
the DLA Office of Operations Research and Resource Analysis (DORRA), and finally 
we will analyze the metrics from January 2006 through September 2006 to determine the 
following:  
• Site effectiveness 
• Measures to improve Customer Wait Time (CWT) 
• Backorder rate at each site 
                                                 




Navy aviation supply depots control all of these sites.  The consumable 
inventories at each site were turned over to DLA for implementation to NIMS.  The “trust 
and control factors…providing the responsiveness required to directly support readiness” 
is a service requirement that DLA must strive to achieve and maintain; which is their 
ability to effectively deliver the right part to support the readiness of their customers.64  If 
the services are going to “give-up” ownership of their inventories, DLA must deliver the 
right part at the right time, and in a timely manner. 
 
A. IMPLEMENTATION CHALLENGES OF NIMS65 
Each of the NIMS sites posed unique challenges.  NAS Ingleside implemented 
NIMS in May 2003; NAS Whidbey Island implemented NIMS in August 2005; and 
MCAS Miramar implemented NIMS in February 2006.66 
1. Naval Air Station Ingleside 
Naval Air Station Ingleside is located in Corpus Christi, Texas, and has surface 
combatant ships and aviation squadrons.  The NIMS site onboard Ingleside provides 
supply support to the aviation squadrons.  Naval Supply personnel operate the NIMS site, 
with inventory management support from DLA.  DLA owns the inventory, but Navy 
personnel manage and issue the inventory. 
The transition of Ingleside's retail inventory management programs were closely 
aligned with DLA's legacy Standard Automated Materiel Management System 
(SAMMS) and the new Business System Modernization (BSM) initiative.  Since the 
systems were almost fully compatible, DLA and Ingleside were immediately able to shift 
to the NIMS strategy of inventory management.  However, the BSM transformation did 
cause some inventory issues.  DLA did not immediately replenish Ingleside’s inventory 
to meet demand, causing a long-term shortage in local inventory.  This will become 
                                                 
 64 Business System Modernization Presentation given by Ms. Cathy Cutler, SES, Executive Director, 
Acquisition Technical and Supply Directorate, Defense Logistics Agency, 4 April 2006, Slide 34 
 65 Per site visit at MCAS Miramar and teleconference with Randy Wendell of the DLA Operations 
Research and Resource Analysis (DORRA) center on October 19, 2006 
 66 Business System Modernization Presentation given by Ms. Cathy Cutler, slide 35 
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apparent as we analyze the metrics.  Overall, the transition was almost seamless at 
Ingleside.  The challenges would soon surface, but more along the lines of Customer 
Wait Time, specifically related to inventory and transportation issues.     
2. Naval Air Station Whidbey Island 
Naval Air Station Whidbey Island is located in Oak Harbor, Washington.  The 
main tenants are aviation squadrons.  The NIMS site onboard Whidbey provides supply 
support to the aviation squadrons.  Naval Supply personnel operate the NIMS site, with 
support from DLA.  DLA owns the inventory, but Navy personnel manage and issue the 
inventory. 
Whidbey Island’s customer base is much larger than Ingleside, not to mention 
more complex because of the different types of customers it serves; for example, fixed-
wing and helicopter squadrons, with multi-service applicable systems.  Whidbey’s 
information technology system did not match DLA’s SAMMS or BSM.  Therefore, 
communication issues hindered the initial implementation. 
3. Marine Corps Air Station Miramar 
Marine Corps Air Station Miramar is located in San Diego, California.  Miramar’s 
main tenants include aviation squadrons from the Marine Corps and the Navy.  The 
NIMS site onboard Miramar provides supply support to all of the aviation squadrons.  
Naval Supply personnel, with support from DLA, operate the NIMS site.  DLA owns the 
inventory and Navy personnel issue the inventory. 
Miramar has been tasked with many transformational changes the past several 
years.  Most recently, Miramar was tasked to undergo a complete shutdown and transfer 
of inventory under the Regional Inventory and Material Management (RIMM) 
streamline.67 Therefore, the inventory level was not at a normal sustainable level.  The 
initial reports that were generated reflect inconsistent data because of this major flaw.   
DLA is finally replenishing Miramar with an adequate inventory to support customers.  
 
                                                 
 67 Per site visit at MCAS Miramar and teleconference with Randy Wendell of the DLA Operations 
Research and Resource Analysis (DORRA) center on October 19, 2006 
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B. DEFINITION OF TERMS USED IN THE METRICS 
Throughout the metrics provided by DLA, many terms are used that must be 
defined to ensure consistency of information interpretation.  These terms, as taken from 
throughout the DLA website are:68  
• Baseline: is the starting point or measurement within each metric, as 
established by the Navy.69  
• Business Systems Modernization (BSM) - will bring DLA’s procurement 
systems to a standard software solution exploiting all processes that 
support its supply chain.70 
• Backorder (BO) DLA does not have the part in the system but a contract 
exists to procure the item. 
• Customer Wait Time (CWT) is the average TPT for all site customer 
requisitions (includes both LDT and WDT).  
• Defense Distribution Center San Diego (DDDC) is located at DLA 32nd 
Street at Naval Station San Diego. 
• Defense Distribution Center San Joaquin (DDJC) is located at San 
Joaquin, CA. 
• Defense Distribution Susquehanna PA (DDSP) has primary responsibility 
for all DLA customers east of the Mississippi River, in Europe, Southwest 
Asia, South America, the Caribbean, Canada, Africa, and Antarctica.  
Defense Distribution San Joaquin, CA, provides this same support to 
customers west of the Mississippi River, in Asia, the Pacific, and 
Australia. 
                                                 
 68 Defense Logistics Agency Website: http://www.dla.mil/. (Last Accessed November 2006) 
 69 Per site visit at MCAS Miramar and teleconference with Randy Wendell of the DLA Operations 
Research and Resource Analysis (DORRA) center on October 19, 2006 
 70 Defense Logistics Agency Website: http://www.dla.mil/j-4/cric/article3.asp.  (Last Accessed on 
November 2006) 
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• Direct Vendor Delivery (DVD) is a material acquisition and distribution 
method that requires vendor delivery directly to the customer. 
• DLA Office of Operations Research and Resource Analysis (DORRA) 
• First Pass Time is defined as the time it takes for an item to be delivered to 
the customer if it is available at the local NIMS site. 
• Goal Line: is what the Navy has established as the goal of the different 
measures of effectiveness.71  
• Inventory Control Point (ICP) An organizational unit or activity within a 
DoD supply system that is assigned the primary responsibility for the 
material management of a group of items either for a particular service or 
for the DoD as a whole. 
• Local Delay Time (LDT) is the average TPT for requisitions where stock 
was issued from the site. 
• Local Issue (LOC ISS) refers to the site closest to the customer, such as 
Miramar, Ingleside, and Whidbey. 
• Net Effectiveness (NET EF) is the site’s rate of immediate issues for only 
those site customer requisitions against the forward stocked items. 
• Other Issues (OTH ISS) are the number of issues from somewhere other 
than the DLA system of distribution. 
• Regional Inventory and Material Management (RIMM) streamlines the 
flow of materials, providing the ability to get the job done with fewer 
resources, and an increased responsiveness to availability for the 
customer. 
                                                 
 71 Per visit at MCAS Miramar and teleconference with Randy Wendell of the DLA Operations 
Research and Resource Analysis (DORRA) center on October 19, 2006 
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• Strategic Distribution Platform (SDP) is the distribution center.  These 
sites include San Joaquin, CA or the DLA center in San Diego at 32nd 
Street. 
• Supply Availability (SUP AV) is the system-wide rate of immediate issue.  
• Total Pipeline Time (TPT) is the elapsed time in days from the requisition 
date to receipt confirmation. 
• Wholesale Delay Time (WDT) is the average TPT for requisitions where 
stock was issued from other than the site. 
• Wholesale issue refers to items issued from DLA distribution centers, such 
as San Joaquin, CA.  
 
C. SITE EFFECTIVENESS 
One of the ways to measure and track the effectiveness of a site is to look at their 
ability to deliver the right parts to their customers in a “reasonable” amount of time, 
thereby supporting the customer’s readiness.  The following Net Effectiveness (Net Ef) 
slides for each one of our sites will show how each has done since the implementation of 
NIMS.   
The Net Effectiveness graphs are complex and rich in the detail they offer.  This 
is how to read them: 
1. The left axis measures the number of supply requests generated at each 
site. 
2. The bar chart bars indicate by month the number of requests and from 
which sites they are being filled, e.g. locally (Loc Iss) vs back order (BO), 
and depot level issue (SDP Iss) vs other issue (Oth Iss).  
3. The straight red line across the top is the Navy’s goal for net effectiveness, 
set at 85%.  Note that Ingleside’s goal and baseline are the both 82%. 
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4. The straight blue line represents each site’s net effectiveness baseline, also 
set by Navy, which averages in the low 80 percentile, but different for 
each site. 
5. The right axis depicts the percentage of requisitions that were actually 
filled by the local DLA site (Net Ef). 
6. The right axis also measures the “Supply Availability (Sup Av)”, depicted 
by the red dotted line, of those requisitions within the DLA supply chain, 
regardless of issue point.  For Whidbey Island this ranged from 95% to 
98%.  This measure differs for each site.       
A major goal of NIMS is to have all requests from customers filled from the 
NIMS sites; indicating that DLA is meeting the needs of the Navy with the right part in a 
timely manner.  The percentages on the right axis of the graph depict the percentage of 
requisitions that were actually filled by the NIMS site “Net Effectiveness (Net Ef)” which 
is depicted by the purple dotted line, and the “Supply Availability (Sup Av)”, depicted by 
the red dotted line, of those requisitions within the DLA supply chain, regardless of issue 
point.  Across the top of the graph, the red “Goal” line, which is overlapping the blue 
“Baseline” on the Ingleside slide, indicates where the Navy wants the NIMS site net 
effectiveness (Net Ef) to be given the high Sup Av and the new DLA strategy of having 
the right part at the right place for the customer.  The blue “Baseline” indicates where Net 







                                                 
 72 Per site visit at MCAS Miramar and teleconference with Randy Wendell of the DLA Operations 
Research and Resource Analysis (DORRA) center on October 19, 2006 
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1. Naval Air Station Ingleside 
Ingleside Net Effectiveness 



















Oth iss 216 402 573 210 244 239 148 160 202
BO 82 88 135 67 156 112 100 104 159
SDP iss 311 319 194 251 233 282
Loc iss 1,037 1,555 1,784 1,125 1,547 1,014 929 909 850
Sup Av 94% 96% 95% 96% 93% 93% 93% 93% 89%
Net Ef 78% 76% 72% 66% 68% 65% 65% 65% 57%
Oct-05 Nov-05 Dec-05 Jan-06 Feb-06 Mar-06 Apr-06 May-06 Jun-06 Jul-06 Aug-06 Sep-06
B aseline & 
Go al: 82%
 
Table 5.1: NAS Ingleside Net Effectiveness73 
  
Ingleside’s net effectiveness fell in September 2006 to 57%, about 25% below its 
goal of 82%.  Ingleside’s net effectiveness has steadily declined from January 2006 when 
it was 78%, only four percentage points below the goal.  Our research disclosed reasons 
for this decline, which includes BSM transition challenges and DLA delay in 
replenishing Ingleside’s inventory to the proper level.  A close study of the graph and 
table above suggests that the fault might lie in the inventory mix held locally.  This may 
be seen in the fact that backorders have almost doubled from 82 in January to 159 in 
September, while the number of locally issued parts declined from 1037 to 850.  Just 
examining the months of August and September, Ingleside’s net effectiveness fell from 
65% to 57%, and the potential explaining factors would seem to be a decline in locally 
                                                 
 73 Source: DLA Operations Research and Resource Analysis (DORRA) September 2006 
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issued parts from 909 to 850 and an increase in BO from 104 to 159 (52.9%).  SDP issues 
also increased substantially, from 233 to 282 (21%).  Both of these would be indicators 
that Ingleside does not have the correct mix of inventory available locally.  The net 
effectiveness six-month average (April thru September) would show Ingleside with an 
average for the period of 64.33%.  What this indicates is that Ingleside is not improving 
when measured against its blue-line goal of 82%.   
Whose problem is this?  At first glance, it would seem to be Ingleside’s problem.  
After all, NIMS was implemented over three years ago and supply availability has been 
in the 90% range all during this period.  In Ingleside’s defense, it appears that DLA is 
having issues supplying Ingleside with the right inventory, which is evident by the 
increase in backorders generated by Ingleside; depicted on the second line of the 
numerical chart and the tan portion of the bars on the graph.  This has significantly 
affected Ingleside’s ability to maintain their Net Ef to the level required by the Navy 
because every time Ingleside is unable to fill a requisition locally, a backorder is 
generated and they take a hit against their Net Ef.  Also as a result of the local NIMS site 
not being able to fill a requisition, the next level in the DLA supply chain must fill the 
requisition.  SDP Iss have been increasing the past several months, as depicted on the 
third line of the numerical chart and the purple portion of the bar graph.  This reinforces 
the results of the second observation, which is ultimately a reflection of having the wrong 
inventory at Ingleside.     
Overall, Ingleside is still 25 percentage points away from achieving the “Goal” of 
Net Effectiveness required by the Navy.  After 3 years of implementation, Net Ef does 







2. Naval Air Station Whidbey Island 
Whidbey Net Effectiveness 























Oth iss 319 396 407 453 467 510 228 235 168 119 644 88
BO 43 81 147 143 113 101 71 160 110 123 167 117
SDP iss 358 669 412 571 999 292
Loc iss 1,725 2,428 2,467 2,515 2,834 2,646 2,331 2,392 2,485 1,746 2,643 2,339
Sup Av 98% 97% 95% 95% 97% 97% 98% 95% 97% 95% 96% 96%
Net Ef 83% 84% 82% 81% 83% 81% 78% 69% 78% 68% 59% 82%
Oct-05 Nov-05 Dec-05 Jan-06 Feb-06 Mar-06 Apr-06 May-06 Jun-06 Jul-06 Aug-06 Sep-06
B aseline = 84%
Go al: 85%
 
Table 5.2: NAS Whidbey Island Net Effectiveness74 
 
Whidbey’s net effectiveness climbed in September 2006 to 82%, about 3% below 
its goal of 85%.  Whidbey’s net effectiveness had been steadily declining from April 
2006 when it was 78%, only seven percentage points below the goal, to a low of 59% in 
August 2006, 26% below the established goal.  A close study of the graph and table 
above suggests that the fault might lie in the inventory mix held locally.  This may be 
seen in the fact that backorders have doubled from 71 in April to 167 in August 
(135.5%), while the number of locally issued parts declined from 2834 in February to a 
low of 1746 in July.  Just examining the period between April and September, Whidbey’s 
net effectiveness ultimately rose from 78% to 82%, but only after suffering a steady 
decline to 59% in August.  The potential explaining factor would seem to be a substantial 
                                                 
 74 Source: DLA Operations Research and Resource Analysis (DORRA) September 2006 
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increase in SDP Iss from 358 to 999 (179.1%).  This is the most significant indication 
that Whidbey and DLA are still having issues finding the correct mix of inventory 
available locally.  The net effectiveness six-month average (April thru September) would 
show Whidbey with an average for the period of 72.3%.  What this indicates is that 
Whidbey is heading in the right direction, but is still 12.7% away from meeting its red-
line goal of 85%. 
Whose problem is this?  At first glance, it would seem to be Whidbey’s problem.  
After all, supply availability has been in the 95 thru 98% range all during this period.  
One can infer that there may be communication issues between Whidbey and DLA to 
find the right inventory mix.  It is apparent that DLA is having issues supplying Whidbey 
with the right inventory, evident by the increase in SDP Iss; depicted on the third line of 
the numerical chart and the purple portion of the bars on the graph.  This has significantly 
affected Whidbey’s ability to maintain their Net Ef to the level required by the Navy 
because every time Whidbey is unable to fill a requisition locally, a backorder is 
generated and they take a hit against their Net Ef.  Also as a result of the local NIMS site 
not being able to fill a requisition, the next level in the DLA supply chain must fill the 
requisition, explaining the increasing SDP Iss rate.  This is ultimately a reflection of 
having the wrong inventory mix at Whidbey.     
Overall, Whidbey is only 3 percentage points away from achieving the Navy’s 










3. Marine Corps Air Station Miramar 
Miramar Net Effectiveness 




















Oth iss 738 800 818 263 511 433 409 722 373
BO 164 245 218 148 444 337 250 699 336
SDP iss 470 991 703 468 967 399
Loc iss 0 736 1,042 951 1,002 856 489 495 359
Sup Av 82% 86% 90% 92% 85% 86% 85% 76% 77%
Net Ef 0% 41% 50% 52% 34% 37% 30% 17% 24%




Table 5.3: MCAS Miramar Net Effectiveness75 
  
Miramar’s net effectiveness has been very erratic.  In February, Net Ef was 41%, 
and fell to 24% in September; 61% away from its goal of 85%.  Our interviews suggested 
some reasons for this decline, including BSM transition challenges and delay in 
replenishing Miramar’s inventory back to the proper level after transitioning back from 
RIMM.  A close study of the graph and table above supports the claim of insufficient 
inventory mix held locally.  This may be seen in the fact that backorders have increased 
from 164 in January to 699 in August, while the number of locally issued parts declined 
from 1042 to 359.  Just examining the months of August and September, Miramar’s net 
effectiveness is finally starting to increase from 17% to 24%.  Nevertheless, what 
happened before September?  The potential explaining factors would seem to be a decline 
                                                 
 75 Source: DLA Operations Research and Resource Analysis (DORRA) September 2006 
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in locally issued parts from 1042 to 359 and an increase in BO from 164 to 699 (326.2%).  
SDP issues also increased substantially, from 470 to 967 in August (105.8% increase).  
Both of these would be indicators that Miramar does not have the correct mix of 
inventory available locally.  The net effectiveness six-month average (April thru 
September) would show Miramar with an average for the period of 32.3%.  What this 
indicates is that Miramar is struggling to improve when measured against its red-line goal 
of 85%. 
Whose problem is this?  At first glance, it would seem to be Miramar’s problem.  
After all, supply availability has been in the mid 80% range all during this period.  In 
Miramar’s defense, they were in the process of transferring their inventory due to the 
RIMM implementation.  Now that NIMS has come online, it appears that DLA is having 
issues supplying Miramar with the right inventory, which is evident by the increase in 
SDP Iss; depicted on the third line of the numerical chart and the purple portion of the 
bars on the graph.  This has significantly affected Miramar’s ability to maintain their Net 
Ef to the level required by the Navy because every time Miramar is unable to fill a 
requisition locally, a backorder is generated and they take a hit against their Net Ef.  As a 
result Miramar not being able to fill a requisition, the next level in the DLA supply chain 
must fill the requisition, explaining the increasing SDP Iss rate.  This is ultimately a 
reflection of having the wrong or insufficient inventory at Miramar.     
Overall, Miramar is 61 percentage points away from achieving the Navy’s Net 
Effectiveness “Goal” of 85%.  The current trend depicts Miramar heading in the right 
direction, especially as they are resourced with the correct inventory. 
4. Summary of Site Effectiveness 
If DLA is going to be successful with NIMS, it must work with the local NIMS 
sites and ensure they are stocking them with the right inventory.  DLA must demand that 
the local sites constantly update usage of the most demanded items to ensure they are 
stocked with the right inventory.  If the local NIMS sites properly track usage and report 
that usage to their inventory control points, there is no reason for the right inventory not 
to be available for immediate issue. 
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D. CUSTOMER WAIT TIME (CWT) 
Customer Wait Time is the main measure that DLA uses to track the effectiveness 
of NIMS at each one of its sites.76  Controlling and reducing CWT is crucial in satisfying 
the customer’s needs, which in this case is the Navy.  As we will see, this is huge 
problem for DLA.  Trying to manage and track the problem areas is not only 
cumbersome, but very time consuming because of its complexity and number of layers 
within the supply chain.  Therefore, we must first discuss the content of each of the 
graphs that will be used to analyze each site. 
The Average Customer Wait Time graph is a good visual measure of how well 
each site is doing in regards to meeting the needs of the Navy.  The graphs are complex 
and rich in the detail they offer.  This is how to read them: 
1. The left axis measures the number of Customer Wait Time days since the 
requisition was generated.  
2. The red bar chart bars indicate by month the Customer Wait Time, which 
includes wholesale delay and local delay times. 
3. The straight red lines are measurement lines for the Customer Wait Time 
(CWT).  The Navy “CWT goal” is eight days, and the “CWT baseline” is 
where the site began its measure. 
4. The straight green lines are measurement lines for the Wholesale Delay 
Time (WDT), using the green WDT dots on the graph.  DLA established 
the “WDT goal” at 25 days, and the “baseline” established at 30 days. 77 
5. The blue dots represent the Local Delay Time (LDT).    
                                                 
 76 Per site visit at MCAS Miramar and teleconference with Randy Wendell of the DLA Operations 
Research and Resource Analysis (DORRA) center on October 19, 2006 
 77 Per site visit at MCAS Miramar and teleconference with Randy Wendell of the DLA Operations 
Research and Resource Analysis (DORRA) center on October 19, 2006 
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It is apparent that the Wholesale Delay Time (WDT) has a major impact on the 
CWT.  Therefore, careful monitoring of the WDT by DLA is critical in identifying and 
minimizing CWT.  Another key point to consider is how Average CWT is calculated.  
Average CWT is a function of the Local Delay Time (LDT) and WDT.  However, to find 
Average CWT, you must know the total weight time for each requisition to average the 
total CWT, as well as the different components of the supply chain that affect the CWT.  
It is impossible to calculate the average CWT from simply adding LDT and WDT, and 
merely dividing by two.  Therefore, we must consider the Supply Response Time graph 
to understand CWT.   
The Supply Response Time graphs will help us understand some of the required 
processes within requisition processing; and how they affect LDT, WDT, and CWT.  
There are four main components of requisition processing:78  
• Requisition Submission Time – the time it takes from submission of a 
requisition by the service to the NIMS site.  
• Inventory Control Point (ICP) Processing Time – the time it takes the 
material manager of that item to find the item and release it for issue. 
• Depot Processing Time – the time it takes for DLA depot to find an item, 
and issue the item to the customer. 
• Transportation/Receipt Take-up Time – time it takes to get the part from 
its inventory location to the customer. 
Therefore, we will look at LDT, WDT, and CWT and the effects that each of the 





                                                 
 78 Per site visit at MCAS Miramar and teleconference with DORRA on October 19, 2006 
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1. Naval Air Station Ingleside 
Average Customer Wait Time
Wholesale Delay and Local Delay for Ingleside Customers and All NSNs
































CWT 36.1 22.4 18.6 22.2 24.3 20.5 26.7 33.6 35.7
Local Reqs 1026 952 1717 1240 1604 799 967 511 242
Wholesale Delay 58.7 39.1 32.9 38.4 40.9 36.5 44.6 50.0 50.5
Local Delay 21.4 11.7 10.8 9.8 14.1 8.2 16.5 16.5 16.1
Wholesale Reqs 662 610 936 952 980 614 550 529 323








Table 5.4: NAS Ingleside Average Customer Wait Time79 
 
As we can see in Table 5.4, Ingleside has had a tough time managing their LDT.  
Since the beginning of 2006, June was the only month that they were even close to 
reaching the Navy’s CWT Goal of eight days.  As we discussed in the last section, supply 
availability was consistently over 90%; indicating the part is within the DLA supply 
chain.  As we can see from the graph, LDT has averaged over 16 days the past several 
months, twice the Navy’s CWT Goal of eight days.  This is a reflection of the wrong 
inventory mix at Ingleside.  To make matters even worse, WDT is averaging 50 days, not 
even close to the CWT Goal.  As a matter of fact, WDT is over eight times greater than 
the CWT Goal.  If this is going to be the trend, Ingleside will not meet the Navy’s Goal  
 
                                                 
 79 Source: DLA Operations Research and Resource Analysis (DORRA) September 2006 
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unless something drastically changes at the wholesale level.  Are there improvements that 
can be made in the requisition process?  In the next section, we will look at the 
requisition process at Ingleside.   
 
Requisition Submission Time, ICP Processing Time, 
Depot Processing Time, and Transportation/Receipt 
Take-up Time
LDT = Local Delay Time (immediate issues from PBT)
WDT = Wholesale Delay Time (all issues other than LDT)












Req Submission ICP Depot Transport/Receipt
 
Table 5.5: NAS Ingleside Supply Response Time80 
 
From Table 5.5, the following conclusions can be drawn concerning Supply 
Response Time: 
• Local Delay Time (LDT): is only affected by requisition submission and 
transportation time delays.  LDT is averaging fifteen days, with an average  
 
                                                 
 80 : Source: DLA Operations Research and Resource Analysis (DORRA) September 2006 
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of seven days for transportation.  This explains why LDT is so high at 
Ingleside.  There is a transportation/receipt issue that needs to be 
addressed.  
• Wholesale Delay Time (WDT): contains all of the requisition processing 
factors.  We can conclude that once a requisition is backordered from the 
local NIMS site and sent to the wholesale level, over two weeks are added 
for transportation/receipt time alone; not to mention the week of ICP 
delay.  If NIMS is going to achieve its goal, it must work out the 
transportation/receipt and ICP delays within the depot process (WDT). 
• Customer Wait Time (CWT): given the enormous transportation/receipt 
delays within LDT and WDT, it is obvious why CWT is so high at 
Ingleside. 
2. Naval Air Station Whidbey Island      
Average Customer Wait Time
































CWT 10.0 6.4 7.6 6.4 8.6 9.4 9.3 9.4 12.0 11.4 13.7
Local Reqs 1066 2630 2636 2776 2798 2642 2666 2748 1941 2875 2516
Wholesale Delay 16.4 15.7 19.0 13.3 17.3 18.7 16.8 17.5 19.5 19.1 30.0
Local Delay 1.3 1.1 1.2 1.8 2.3 1.8 2.0 1.8 2.7 1.7 1.8
Wholesale Reqs 1635 1484 1463 1845 1996 2168 2586 2569 2379 3578 1846
Nov-05 Dec-05 Jan-06 Feb-06 Mar-06 Apr-06 May-06 Jun-06 Jul-06 Aug-06 Sep-06
 CWT go al = 8 days
 CWT baseline = 
13 days
 WDT baseline & 




Table 5.6: NAS Whidbey Island Average Customer Wait Time81 
                                                 
 81 Source: DLA Operations Research and Resource Analysis (DORRA) September 2006 
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From Table 5.6 we can conclude that Whidbey is much better off than Ingleside.  
LDT has consistently been well below the required standard set forth by the Navy.  This 
is a reflection of an efficient requisition/receipt process at Whidbey.  Having the right 
inventory at the local site is crucial in NIMS achieving the Navy’s CWT Goal, which is 
further reinforced by the fact that Whidbey processes 10 times as many requisitions and 
is still well below the CWT Goal at the local level.  However, once an item is 
backordered, meaning Whidbey does not have it in-stock and the order must be sent to 
the depot level, the same WDT delay scenario occurs.  The delays are not as significant, 
indicating that Whidbey is working with DLA to identify the items that are demanded by 
their customers.  What is happening at the wholesale level that is causing the Average 
CWT to be so bad?  In the next section, we will look at the Supply Response Time and 





Requisition Submission Time, ICP Processing Time, 
Depot Processing Time, and Transportation/Receipt 
Take-up Time
LDT = Local Delay Time (immediate issues from PBT)
WDT = Wholesale Delay Time (all issues other than LDT)













Req Submission ICP Depot Transport/Receipt
 
Table 5.7: NAS Whidbey Island Supply Response Time82 
  
From Table 5.7, the following conclusions can be drawn concerning Supply 
Response Time at Whidbey: 
• Local Delay Time (LDT): is only affected by requisition submission and 
transportation time delays.  LDT is averaging only two to three days, 
which is well within the prescribed standard established by the Navy. 
• Wholesale Delay Time (WDT): contains all of the requisition processing 
factors.  As seen at Ingleside, once a requisition is backordered from the 
local NIMS site and sent to the wholesale level, over two weeks are added 
for transportation/receipt and ICP processing.  If supply availability is so  
 
                                                 
 82 Source: DLA Operations Research and Resource Analysis (DORRA) September 2006 
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high, why is it taking so long for DLA to identify the item and transport it 
to the NIMS site?  There seems to be too many levels of control at the 
wholesale level. 
• Customer Wait Time (CWT): given the enormous transportation/receipt 
and ICP processing delays within WDT, it is obvious why Average CWT 
is so high at Whidbey.   
3. Marine Corps Air Station Miramar 
Average Customer Wait Time



































CWT 29.0 19.2 18.6 21.1 15.1 17.1 19.6 19.6 18.2
Local Reqs 0 408 1232 1459 943 1629 978 937 620
Wholesale Delay 29.0 20.0 19.9 22.4 15.6 16.7 20.6 20.3 19.1
Local Delay 0.0 4.0 8.0 13.8 9.7 19.9 12.4 13.4 10.7
Wholesale Reqs 5442 8170 10356 8375 9923 12061 7290 7784 4822
Nov-05 Dec-05 Jan-06 Feb-06 Mar-06 Apr-06 May-06 Jun-06 Jul-06 Aug-06 Sep-06
 WDT baseline = 
22 days
 WDT go al = 20 
days
 CWT baseline 
= 6 days





Table 5.8: MCAS Miramar Average Customer Wait Time83 
 
From our initial observation of Table 5.8, it appears as if Miramar is actually 
improving its situation with regard to Average CWT.  As you can see, CWT went from 
29 days in January to 18.2 days in September.  During the same timeframe, LDT actually 
doubled.  As discussed in the previous section, Miramar has been trying to recapture their 
                                                 
83 Source: DLA Operations Research and Resource Analysis (DORRA) September 2006 
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inventory after converting back from RIMMs.    Therefore, as Miramar tries to find the 
right inventory mix, inherent delays will continue to plague their numbers.  So what is 
happening with Supply Response Time to cause their numbers to stagnate?  In the next 
section, we will look at the wholesale level and try to pinpoint the problem areas. 
Requisition Submission Time, ICP Processing Time, 
Depot Processing Time, and Transportation/Receipt 
Take-up Time
LDT = Local Delay Time (immediate issues from PBT)
WDT = Wholesale Delay Time (all issues other than LDT)











Req Submission ICP Depot Transport/Receipt
 
Table 5.9: MCAS Miramar Supply Response Time84 
From Table 5.9, the following conclusions can be drawn concerning Supply 
Response Time: 
• Local Delay Time (LDT): is averaging about two weeks, which is twice as 
high as the Navy’s Goal.  Requisition processing procedures are the same 
as the other sites, but it is still taking twice as long at Miramar.  One of the 
                                                 
 84 Source: DLA Operations Research and Resource Analysis (DORRA) September 2006 
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main conclusions that can be drawn from this graph is that Miramar’s 
CWT is also suffering from transportation/receipt delays; which explains 
the high LDT numbers. 
• Wholesale Delay Time (WDT): once a requisition is backordered from 
Miramar and sent to the wholesale level, it is averaging ten to fourteen 
days for transportation/receipt alone; not to mention another week for ICP 
processing.   If supply availability is so high, why is it taking so long for 
DLA to identify the item and transport it to the NIMS site?  There seem to 
be too many levels of control at the wholesale level, which we identified 
in the Whidbey analysis. 
• Customer Wait Time (CWT): given the enormous transportation and ICP 
processing delays within WDT, it is obvious why Average CWT is so high 
at Miramar.  This situation is actually worse for Miramar than for the other 
sites. 
4. Customer Wait Time Summary 
The key strategy to solve Customer Wait Time problems is to position the right 
inventory closest to the customer, while providing the best support and optimizing 
transportation costs.  If NIMS is going to meet the CWT Goal as established by the Navy, 
it must address the delays at the wholesale level.  Are the levels of control too 
cumbersome at the wholesale level?  Can the process be streamlined?  These are 
questions that must be addressed and further analyzed. 
 
E. BACKORDER RATE 
Backorders are another major indicator to DLA that an inventory problem exists 
at the local NIMS site. 85  Regardless if the item is within the DLA system or not, if a 
requisition has to be passed to the next level of the supply chain, a backorder will be 
generated and tracked.  First Pass CWT is defined as the time it takes for an item to be 
                                                 
 85 Per site visit at MCAS Miramar and teleconference with Randy Wendell of the DLA Operations 
Research and Resource Analysis (DORRA) center on October 19, 2006 
 52
delivered to the customer if it is available at the local NIMS site.86  Therefore, comparing 
the Average Backorder and First Pass CWT is a good way to measure the effectiveness of 
inventory management.  DLA has allowed each of the NIMS sites to influence the levels 
of inventory required to meet the needs of the customer.  Therefore, if DLA and the local 
NIMS site are communicating, inventory levels should be consistent with supply 
availability. Local inventory levels (NIMS sites) will never mirror supply availability 
(DLA 95%) due to cost constraints.  Imagine the cost of having that inventory at the 95% 
level.  That is precisely why DLA is trying to minimize by consolidating inventories.  
Therefore, we will analyze two graphs that will help us see what is actually occurring at 
each site.  
The Average Backorder and First Pass CWT graph depicts the CWT for a First 
Pass immediate issue requisition, as depicted by the bar graph. 87   The graph is complex 
and rich in the detail it offers. This is how to read it: 
1. The left axis measures the average number of Backorder and First Pass 
days for each requisition, as they relate to CWT. 
2. The blue bar chart bars indicate by month the Average First Pass CWT. 
3. The green dots on the graph depict the Average Backorder CWT.  They 
portray the CWT for those items that are sent above the local NIMS site.   
The second graph, Number of Open Backorders > 120 Days, represents the 
number of backorders that are delayed more than 120 days.  This has been designated as 
a significant problem by DLA, hence the tracking. 88  Therefore, we can compare the 
graphs at each of the sites and determine if DLA is achieving one of its goals; tailoring 
inventory to meet each service’s requirements.  If DLA is properly managing its 
inventory, the backorder CWT should be decreasing.   
 
                                                 
 86 Per site visit at MCAS Miramar and teleconference with DORRA on October 19, 2006 
87 Per site visit at MCAS Miramar and teleconference with DORRA on October 19 2006 
88 Per site visit at MCAS Miramar and teleconference with Randy Wendell of the DLA Operations 
Research and Resource Analysis (DORRA) center on October 19, 2006 
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1. Naval Air Station Ingleside 
 
Average Backorder and First Pass 
Customer Wait Time






















BO Reqs 155 109 71 104 71 52
First Pass Time 15.1 20.4 14.5 20.1 24.0 24.5
First Pass Reqs 1957 2369 1273 1332 899 475
BO Time 92.4 82.2 87.8 97.9 122.2 115.0




Table 5.10: NAS Ingleside Average Backorder CWT89 
 
As depicted in Table 5.10, the First Pass CWT is actually getting worse.  This was 
evident as we looked at Net Effectiveness and the Average CWT, which were both far 
from reaching their goals.  In their defense, the number of backorders is actually 
decreasing, as shown in the first line of the numerical chart.  The Average Backorder 
CWT has been steadily increasing since April, which indicates a significant problem.  As 
discussed in the previous sections, the wholesale level is having serious 
transportation/receipt issues.   
 
                                                 
 89 Source: DLA Operations Research and Resource Analysis (DORRA) September 2006 
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Number of Open Backorders > 120 








# BOs 264 268 207 194 180 211 225 232
Oct-05 Nov-05 Dec-05 Jan-06 Feb-06 Mar-06 Apr-06 May-06 Jun-06 Jul-06 Aug-06 Sep-06
  
Table 5.11: NAS Ingleside Number of Backorders >120 Days90 
 
In Table 5.11, we can see that the number of backorders is still lower than our 
starting point of January 2006.  The increasing trend that is depicted on the graph could 
be attributed to having to renegotiate contracts with new manufacturers, as well as a high 
demand for priority items.  DLA’s goal is to have all backorder delays below 120 days.91  
As resources become even scarcer and more expensive, this problem will only escalate if 
it is not managed properly.  Are we seeing the same scenario at the other sites?  In the 




                                                 
 90 Source: DLA Operations Research and Resource Analysis (DORRA) September 2006 
 91 Per site visit at MCAS Miramar and teleconference with Randy Wendell of the DLA Operations 
Research and Resource Analysis (DORRA) center on October 19, 2006 
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2. Naval Air Station Whidbey Island 
 
Average Backorder and First Pass 
Customer Wait Time
for Whidbey Customers and All NSNs















BO Reqs 274 317 261 206 324 275
First Pass Time 4.9 5.9 5.4 6.7 6.6 4.7
First Pass Reqs 4482 4826 4941 4014 6010 3967
BO Time 70.7 48.5 70.1 97.8 95.6 130.0
Apr-06 May-06 Jun-06 Jul-06 Aug-06 Sep-06
da
ys
         
Table 5.12: NAS Whidbey Island Average Backorder CWT92 
 
In Table 5.12, Whidbey’s First Pass performance, as depicted by the bar graph, is 
consistent with their Net Effectiveness performance that we saw in the previous sections.  
The green dots on the graph, which depict the Average Backorder CWT, tell the same 
story as at Ingleside.  The inherent delays at the depot level keep surfacing, regardless of 
the angle.  NIMS allows Whidbey to perform at the CWT level set forth by the Navy, 
especially given the amount of First Pass requisitions that they fill, depicted by the third 
line of the numerical graph.  What is causing the increasing delays at the wholesale level?  
                                                 
 92 Source: DLA Operations Research and Resource Analysis (DORRA) September 2006 
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Do the backorders still point to the transportation/receipt issues?  In the next section, we 
will look at the number of backorders greater than 120 days at Whidbey. 
Number of Open Backorders > 120 days 












# BOs 275 291 278 430 461 476 178
Oct-05 Nov-05 Dec-05 Jan-06 Feb-06 Mar-06 Apr-06 May-06 Jun-06 Jul-06 Aug-06 Sep-06
 
Table 5.13: NAS Whidbey Island Number of Backorders >120 Days93 
 
Table 5.13 further reinforces the success of NIMS at Whidbey.  The number of 
backorders greater than 120 days has significantly decreased the past several months.  
This is a result of successful inventory levels at the local site, which means less 
backorders sent to the wholesale level.  There is still a problem with 
transportation/receipt at the wholesale level. If the local NIMS site can minimize the 
number of backorders, the wholesale level can focus its resources on correcting its 




3. Marine Corp Air Station Miramar 
 
Average Backorder and First Pass 
Customer Wait Time
























BO Reqs 946 829 1038 876 949 651
First Pass Time 11.8 9.2 12.0 9.9 10.7 8.8
First Pass Reqs 8489 9693 12060 6628 7165 4364
BO Time 85.8 68.5 61.2 66.4 62.0 65.2
Apr-06 May-06 Jun-06 Jul-06 Aug-06 Sep-06
da
ys
         
Table 5.14: MCAS Miramar Average Backorder CWT94 
 
Table 5.14 is also consistent with the observations in the previous sections.  Given 
Miramar’s implementation problems, they are improving their First Pass CWT, as 
depicted by the bar graph.  Additionally, the green dots are also consistent with their 
efforts to find the right inventory levels, given they are being replenished after 
relinquishing almost their entire inventory to the RIMM process.  Miramar is working 
hard, as depicted by the number of requisitions they process and the decreasing 
                                                                                                                                                 
 93 Source: DLA Operations Research and Resource Analysis (DORRA) September 2006 
 94 Source: DLA Operations Research and Resource Analysis (DORRA) September 2006 
 58
backorders.  Miramar has a bad backorder history95.  In the next section, we will look at 









# BOs 1197 1045 720 722 711 927 1143 1051
Oct-05 Nov-05 Dec-05 Jan-06 Feb-06 Mar-06 Apr-06 May-06 Jun-06 Jul-06 Aug-06 Sep-06
Goal = 500
Baseline = 1000
Number of Open Backorders > 120 days 
for Miramar Customers and all NSNs
 
Table 5.15: MCAS Miramar Number of Backorders >120 Days96 
 
Table 5.15 is a bit different from the other two “Backorders greater than 120 
days” graphs that we have looked at.  First, Miramar has at least twice the number of 
backorders, as well as five to six times the number of backorders greater than 120 days, 
than the other sites.  Therefore, Miramar and DLA have decided to set a goal, depicted by 
the red horizontal line, specifically aimed at reducing the number of backorders.  The 
backorder issue at Miramar is significantly larger than the other sites, but at least the 
                                                 
 95 Per site visit at MCAS Miramar and teleconference with Randy Wendell of the DLA Operations 
Research and Resource Analysis (DORRA) center on October 19, 2006 
 96 Source: DLA Operations Research and Resource Analysis (DORRA) September 2006 
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trend is finally headed in the right direction.  As Miramar defines its inventory 
requirements, the number of backorders will continue to decrease. 
4. Backorder Summary 
Overall, NIMS appears to be improving in the area of backorders.  As DLA and 
the NIMS sites work to define inventory levels, the Backorder and First Pass CWT will 
only continue to improve.  However, the same delays will continue to plague the 
wholesale level until some real solutions aimed at correcting transportation/receipt and 
ICP processing are implemented.  Additionally, as resources become even scarcer, the 
problem of delays at the wholesale level will only get worse.  Alternatives must be 
identified earlier in the process, and active participation with the customer’s requirements 
must be addressed.   
This chapter provided an analysis of the effectiveness of NIMS in achieving its 
goals at the three Navy test sites: Ingleside, Whidbey, and Miramar.  We looked at the 
implementation challenges at each of the NIMS sites, the definitions used within the 
metrics provided by the DLA Office of Operations Research and Resource Analysis 
(DORRA), and analyzed the metrics in regards to site effectiveness, customer wait time, 
and back order rate. The next chapter will provide observations and recommendations of 
our analysis of the preliminary metrics data from the test sites. It will also provide 
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VI. OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. SUMMARY 
Supply chain management is the operation of continuous, unbroken, 
comprehensive, and all-inclusive logistics process, from initial customer 
order for material or services to the ultimate satisfaction of the customer’s 
requirement.97   
According to Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), the National Inventory 
Management Strategy (NIMS) initiative seeks to manage consumable items from the 
point of acquisition to the point of consumption for the services. This would allow DLA 
to provide:98  
• Total Asset Visibility 
• Reduction in Inventory 
• Reduction in Customer Wait Time  
Although DLA continues to make progress in the implementation of NIMS, the 
wholesale delays, transportation/receipt, and the high-level of backorders have led us to 
conclude that NIMS has not been effective in improving supply chain management 
within the Navy and DLA.  The following observations will support our conclusions.    
 
B. OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Long Term Strategy   
There is no DoD wide common plan to implement NIMS. DoD continues to rely 
on individual efforts of DLA and the services to achieve the goal of implementing NIMS. 
Until DoD develops a common strategy that mandates the services to implement NIMS, 
DLA will not be successful in the goal of achieving its single national inventory strategy.     
                                                 
97  GAO Report, GAO-06-983T, “DOD’S HIGH-RISK AREAS: Challenges Remain in Supply Chain 
Management”, July 2006 
98 GAO Report, GAO-03-709, “Defense Inventory: Several Actions Are Needed to Further DLA’s 
Efforts to Mitigate Shortages of Critical Parts”, August 2003 
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2. Delays in the Implementation of NIMS 
Since May 2003, the NIMS initiative has been in the testing period (Phase III) and 
has a DoD wide implementation scheduled of 2009.99  As of September 2006, DLA 
continues to make progress with the implementation of NIMS, however, it will be several 
years before NIMS can be fully implemented DoD wide. The delays in meeting 
scheduled milestones can be attributed to the lack of “total buy-in” from the services; a 
Program Budget Decision 422 directed the services to implement a plan to eliminate 
duplicative retail services by transferring ownership of inventories to DLA. The services 
have not provided DLA with the necessary resources to ensure DoD wide 
implementation.    
3. Total Asset Visibility  
One of NIMS main objectives is to provide total asset visibility; however, there 
are two issues hindering the achievement of this objective.  First, there is no common 
strategy guiding the services on information systems integration. As of May 2004, DoD 
operated 210 inventory related information systems that were not integrated.100 Second, 
the integration and interoperability of information systems continues to be a challenge. 
An example of this was the implementation at Whidbey Island; the inventory information 
system was incompatible with DLA’s Standard Automated Material Management System 
and Business Systems Modernization. 
4. Inventory Levels 
The inventory held locally has a major impact on Net Effectiveness.  If DLA is 
going to measure its performance based on net effectiveness, it must find ways to 
improve the inventory mix at each site.  From our analysis in Chapter 5, net effectiveness 
was lacking at all sites because they were unable to fill the requisition locally, thereby 
generating a backorder.  At all sites, the backorder rate was increasing.  This is a result of 
the wrong inventory mix at each site.   
                                                 
99 GAO Report, GAO-03-709, “Defense Inventory: Several Actions Are Needed to Further DLA’s 
Efforts to Mitigate Shortages of Critical Parts”, August 2003 
100 GAO Report, GAO-05-15: “Defense Inventory: Improvements Needed in DOD’s Implementation 
of its Long-Term Strategy for Total Asset Visibility of its Inventory”, December 2004 
 63
The recommendation for this problem would be further analysis on the fill rates of 
high demand items, and how inventory levels are established.  Specifically, the Reorder 
Points (ROP) need to be redefined and demand rates tracked more efficiently.  With the 
number of legacy information systems in-place, there may be inconsistencies with the 
information that is actually being tracked.  One sole information system must be used to 
track ROP and demand rates, especially once DLA starts implementing NIMS across the 
services. 
5. Customer Wait Time (CWT) 
As described in previous chapters, if NIMS is going to be successful, DLA must 
effectively and efficiently deliver the right part in a timely manner to its customers to 
support readiness.  From our analysis in Chapter 5, Customer Wait Time at all three sites 
was above the Navy’s established goal of 8 days, with Whidbey being the closest at 13.7 
days.   From the Average CWT and Supply Response Time graphs, it is apparent that 
transportation/receipt and Intermediate Control Point delays at the wholesale level really 
hinder CWT.   In regard to the transportation/receipt issue, it is hard to determine if there 
is actually a transportation issue or if there is a problem with the customer acknowledging 
receipt of the part in the supply system.  The ICP delays are just as difficult to pinpoint.  
Once an item is backordered and enters the wholesale level, the ICP should be able to 
immediately release the item for issue.  However, based on the metrics, this is averaging 
seven to ten days. 
Our recommendation for correcting the transportation/receipt and ICP delays is 
for DLA to apply best practices to its logistics and transportation operations.  By doing 
this, it will follow the Transportation Vision for the 21st century to become a world-class, 
globally capable, inter-modal transportation system that is responsive, efficient, fully 
integrated, and in partnership with industry - - ensuring readiness, sustainability, and 
quality of life.101  Another recommendation would be to split up transportation and 
receipt timeframes.  This would enable DLA to determine if there are actually 
transportation issues or the problem rests in the proper processing of the requisition.   
                                                 
101 Depart of Defense Office of Executive Secretary www.dod.mil/execsec/adr97/chap15.html (Last 
Accessed November 2006) 
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6. Metrics Data 
The performance metrics used by DORRA are too cumbersome.  The graphs and 
tables contain too many variables that can be easily misinterpreted.  For example, one of 
the sites was unable to determine their status by merely reading the metrics.  They 
assumed that they were underperforming or not properly supporting their customers.  
After careful review of their graphs and discussions with DORRA, they were actually 
performing to the level expected by DLA. 
We recommend that DORRA minimize that amount of information they put on 
each of the metrics, or send a workable version to the sites so they can gauge their 
strengths and weaknesses.  It is obvious that these metrics are generated for a higher level 
brief.  The sites need to be able to decipher the information that DORRA is gathering and 
presenting to others. 
 
C. SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
This research concluded that NIMS is not effective based on the examination of 
preliminary data of site effectiveness, customer wait time, and backorder rate from three 
Navy test sites. Nevertheless, these measures do not necessarily reflect the performance 
of the initiative; it simply demonstrates that NIMS is not effective at these test sites.    As 
NIMS continue to be implemented, DoD wide, future research should examine cost 
metrics to analyze gained efficiencies and cost savings in supply chain management.        
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